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International Invention: Implications for Technology Mark.et Analysis 
Robert E. Evenson 
Yale University 
This paper examines international data on patented inventions, R &D 
expenditures and scientists and engineers engaged in inventive activity. 
It reaches two principal conc.lusions which have some bearing on the modeling 
of firm behavior and possibly on policy actions which might be taken toward the 
The first conclusion is that the data show comparativestimulation of ilLvention. 
advantage patten•s in invention similar to patterns observed in ·products. The 
production of 1>icneering invention is concentrated in certain firms lo-;ated in 
countries with the best economic laboratories for invention. Large parts of 
industry in most countries import inventions and concentrate on adaptive inven­
tion rather than investing heavily in R & D. The second conclusion is that the 
data show- that it.ventions per scientist and engineer 
have declined from the late 1960 1 s to the late _1970's in almost a.ll of 
the 50 cotmtries for which data are available. 
These conc~tsions are based on data on patented ir.ventions from many 
only thnt patented inventions ~recountries. To d~fend them one mu5t argue not 
a reasonabl.e pro:y for inventions in general but that there is a reasonable 
degree of internrtional comparability to this proxy relationship. Further, 
to support the second conclusion one must also argue that no major changes 
• 
-2-
in the proxy relationship have taken place over the past ten to fifteen 
years. 
The defense of the conclusions is threefold. First, because of inter­
national conventions regarding patenting and the requirements for patent­
ability· and the ~igh °ciegree- of .int_ernational_ patenting, i.e.,· patents granted 
to foreigners, a general standardized legal ·basis for patenting ·exists. This 
is further standardized by the widespread adoption of the International Patent 
. Ciassification system: Second, patent data show regular pa.tterns and consistency. 
Patenting is highly correlated with R &. D spending in the U.S. and other countries 
where reasonably good data exist. Most patents granted are subsequently cited 
l 
as "next best art" in the u.s. and other countri_es with citation- requirements. 
Patent infringement cases are important enough jn most coun-
tries to indicate that they are not trivial or irrelevant. Finally, there is 
little evidence that standards of patentability have changed drastically j_n 
recent years in most major centers of invention. _Nor is there evide~ce to suggest 
that firms in almost all industries in almost every country of the world ha,re 
changed their policy toward obtaining patents to a degree sufficient to expi.ain 
the data. 
Part I of the paper presents a descriptive summary of patent data and 
discusses different types of patent systems and.standards for patentability. 
Part II is organized t~ show the trqfe patterns of the data. Part 
-III provides data supporting the conclu_sion that inventions per scientist and 
engineer , · have declim.d and argues the case for 
interpreting this phenomenon as due to exhaustic,n of "inventio~ potential". 
Part IV discusses implications for technology m.,rket analysis. 
I. International Invention: A Descriptive Summary 
To interpret data on patenting it is usefu:. first to summarize 
the options open to a firm to alte:. the technology it uses. 
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1. It can engage in fundamental or basic research with the objective 
of obtaining findings which will improve the efficiency of its more applied 
research. 
2. It can engage in applied research designed to invent a new product 
or process and bring it to the development stage. 
3. It can engage in the testing, pilot prod1,!ction and plan·t design work 
required to bring inventions deveioped by its own applied research into use. 
4. It can purchase inventions (or in the case of unprotected inventions, 
imitate them) and engage in strictly adaptive research and development bring­
ing them into u~e. 
5. It.can purchase semi- or fully-developed inventions "embodied" in 
machines, chemicals or "tum-key" plants. In this .case it engages only in 
minor modificat.!ons of other inventions. 
Of these activities, (1) produces few patentable inventions; (2) 
produces most conventional or invention patents; (3) produces a number of 
invention patents (especially of process inventions) and a number of "petty" 
patents {utilit~· models); (4) produces most petty patents and (5) generally 
does not produc~ patented inventions. 
Legal systems and industrial organization pol;cy in different countries 
influence the types of inventive activities w1dertaken by firms and the 
patentability o: inventions. Some countries pursue policies which encourage 
the holding of ::Oventions in trade secrecy. Uhen industrial organization 
structures effectively discourage compe~ition in an ind~stry, firms may have 
little incentiv~ co sell new technology in direct form and will attempt to 
capture 1·enrs through the sale of new technology embodied in products. This 
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tendency is reinforced by trade secrecy laws which provide penalties for 
the. pirating of trade secrets. 
The traditional "invention patent" is designed to provide an alternative 
form of protection by granting the inventor legal means by which to prevent 
others from copying or using the invention without permission for a limited 
period of time (usually 15 years). Invention patent documents are required 
to provide an "enabling disclosure" which sufficiently describes the invention 
so as to enable one skilled in the technology field to replicate or make the 
. . 2.. 
invention. · 
Three fundamental requirements must be met by an invention to qualify 
for the standard invention patent: 
1) The invention must be "novel" 
• 
2) The invention must be "useful" 
3) The invention must exhibit an "inventive step" i.e., it must be 
unobvious to practitioners skilled in the technology field. 
These requirements are important to an understanding of international 
patent data when considered in conjunction with inten1ational patent "con­
ventions", chiefly the Paris Convention. Membership .in these conventions 
generally requires 1) that the three requirements for patentability be judg~d 
by international standards and 2) that member countries grant patent pro-
. l 
tection to inventors from other countries provided these standards are met. 
An important alternative to the invention patent, usually termed a "pe.tty" 
patent or utilitr model is used in some countries. Petty patents generall)' 
have a very weak inventive step requirement and in practical terms do not 
always require novelty against the world's inventions but only against natirynal 
or regional inventions. In addition design £!_tents which do not require 
inventive steps and have relatively weak usefulness requirements are granted 
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by most countries. Trademarks which require only novelty are likewise 
granted by most countries. In addition a number of countries also grant 
~~ patents primarily for asexually reproduced plants. 
Table 1 provides data for some 50 countries on numbers of invention 
patents granted for 4 periods: 1967, 1971, 1976, and 1980. The countries have 
been grouped in 6 classes: 1) industrialized market economies with 
high growth rates over the past 20 years; 2) industrialized 
market economies with moderate slow growth rates; 3) semi-industrialized cowitries 
with high growth rates; 4) semi-industrialized countries with slow to 
moderate growth rates; 5) middle-to-low income developing countries and 
6) industrialized planned economies. 4 · 
Reference to the table will reveal a few £.nomalies, particularly for 
the developing countries where some data are m~ssing. A later table 
provides a summary by type of economy and a nut.iber of generalizations are 
best drawn at tr.at level. In discussing this and the next several tables 
attention will be given to individual country data. Table 1 shows that 
the relative rar,king of patenting by national ~.nventors has changed appre­
ciably over the period. The United States was the clear leader in 1967 
with more than twice as many patents granted an the USSR in second place. 
France, Japan and the U.K. followed in third, fourth and fifth place. By 
1980 both the UfSR and Japan had surpassed the U.S. 
West 
Germany had moved into fourth place with both rrance and the U.K. experienc­
ing substantial declines in patents granted to nationals. 
Patents gr2.nted to nationals in the U.S. v-•ere only 72 percent of the 
Table 1: Invention Patents Granted by Country: Selected Years Patents ·Granted to Nationals 
Patent!l Granted to Nationals Patent~ Granted to Foreigners in Foreisn Countri.:-s 
1967 1971 1976 1!180 1967 1971 1976 ~ lliZ. 1971 1976 1980 
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11. Semi-Industrialized Market Eccnomies 
A. Rapid Growth 
Spain 2.158 2,042 
Israel 178 202 
Greece 975 1.221 
Singapore 5 2 
P~rtuzal 84 214 
Brazil 262 429 
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Source: Industrial Property Statistics 
World Intellectual Pro~erty Organization, Geneva 
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1967 level in 1980 (only 60 percent in 1979). For all other industrialized 
market economies patents granted to nationals actually increased slightly 
(2 percent) from 1967-1980. Patents granted to foreigners in the U.S. rose 
by 71 percent over the period. For other industrialized nations patents 
granted to foreigners declined·to only 66 percent of the 1967 level (about 
43 percent of this decline was attributable to the decline in patenting 
abroad by U.S. inventors). In consequence the share of foreigners patenting 
in the U.S. rose from 22 percent in 1967 to 40 percent in 1980. 
Of the industrialized economies both Japan and West Germany expanded 
patenting activity at home markedly. Only Japan. among large industrialized 
nations, realized a significant expansion of pat~nting abroad. The U.S. 
continued to be the dominant country in patenting abroad with West Germany, 
Japan and France following. 5 
The semi-industrialized nations have a somewhat varied experience in 
terms of patenting. Most of the rapid-growth countries show expansion in 
patents granted to nationals (or have relatively high levels of patenting, e.g., 
Spain). _ .lhe slower growing semi-industrialize<l countries in general have 
experienced some decline in national patenting. ~~~Pn~~ gr~n~Pd ~o for-
eigners have tended to increase in the fast grow~ng semi-industrialized 
countries and to decrease quite drastically in the slow-growth countries 
(for the group, patenting by foreigners is only LO percent of its 1967 
level in 1980). This decline reflects policy changes by this group of 
countries and other developing countries toward 11ulti-national firms. In 
general, through administrative procedures and ttrough exclusio~ of certain 
_technology areas frdm patentability (chiefly food and drugs), patenting by 
foreigners has been cut back (e.g., India). Unfortunately, as will be discussed later, 
these policies have not produced significant exp,nsion in patenting by 
-8-
nationals. 
The developing countries on the whole have relatively low levels of 
national patenting and high ratios of patenting by foreigners (policies in 
India have curtailed the latter). While data on patenting abroad are in­
complete, available data for both semi-industrialized and developing 
countries indicate that the ratio of patenting abroad to patenting at home 
is much lower than is the case for industrialized countries. 
The planned economies in general have relatively high levels of patent-
.. __ing by nationais and low levels of foreign patenting and patenting abroad. 
With the exce:ption of East Germany and Romania, the planned economies have 
expanded patenting activity over the period. This and the low levels of 
patenting by planned economy inventors in industrialized market economies suggests
• 
that patentability standards may differ considerably between industrialized 
6 
and planned economies. 
Table 2 provides a summary of data for 9 countries operating utility 
model or petty patent systems. It is of some interest to note that all of 
these countries are relatively successful in invention given their levels of 
development (Brazil introduced its utility model in 1970 and we have only recent 
data; Italy has not reported recent data). Petty patents are granted primarily 
to nationals (although Germany has granted a significant number to foreigners 
from countries without petty patent systems). l'hey are also granted primarily 
to individuals rather than to large corporate flrms. Most are granted in mechan­
ical technology areas rather than in chemical 01 biogenetic technology areas. 
The advantage of the petty patent is that it broadens the invention 
base by providing incentives to encourage individuals and small firms to 
develop inventions. Some semi-industrial countries, notably South Korea 
and now Brazil, are using this legal system effectively. Japan and Germany 
. 
Table 2: Utility Models (Petty Patents) Granted 1967 
UtilitI Models GrantedAEElications 
Nationals Forei~ners Nationals Foreigners 
1967 1975 1980 1967 1975 1980 1967 1975 1980 1967 1975 1980 
11,344 11,938 8,153 20,948 1:!,099 10,252 2.,400 2,181 1,879Germany (FR) 42,214 30,114 26,094 . 
Italy 4,418 - 778 3,935 702 
Japan ·109,154 178,992 190,388 l,906 1,668 1,397 20,601 4'.7 ,449 49,468 721 957 
S33 
Philippines 141 565 762 2 7 24 94 331 465 - 9 3 
0\
I 
:l,775 1,680 · 4 25 20·I Poland .l,647 1,896 2,523 22 31 36 411 
153 159 • 9 25 6·Portugal 139 78. 118 25 13 15 77 
6,177 4,128 3,845 600 2,041 "J,131Spain 7,601 7,650 5,830 710 1,353 1,162 
Brazil - - 1,657 - - 89 - - 131 - - 13 
Korea - 7,052 . 7,936 - 238 622 -- 1,032 1,315 - 14 438".' 
Source: Industrial Property annual statistical reports 
• 
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have used it effectively in the past. 
Table 3 provides data for two weaker legal instruments. The Industrial 
Design Patent and the Trademark. In some sense, the design patent is a petty 
patent and may serve a similar purpose. Those councries with petty patent 
systems also have relatively active design patent systems. Design patents 
have generally not experienced the same pattern of decline observed in 
invention patents. Except for Canada and the smaller European Community 
countries, design patenting by foreigners is a relatively small fraction of 
total patenting. This is particularly true for semi-industrialized and 
developing countries where multi-national firms have not utilized this 
instrument for prc;tection (in contrast to the use of invention patents). 
The data on trademarks, on the other hand, show that foreign firms 
are using tradema~:k protection in most markets including the semi-indus­
trialized and developing countries. An expansion of trademark registration 
to nationals and foreigners is observed in the majority of economies of all 
types except the planned economies. This is consistent with the general 
pattern of industrial trade expansion. 
II. Comparative .Advantage Patterns 
Table 1 proyided data on patents granted to nationals at home and on 
patents granted to nationals abroad as well as on patents granted to foreign 
inventors. The ratio of patents granted to nationals to total patents granted 
varied from a hlgl· of • 76 in the planned economies (and the U.S.) to a low 
of .11 for all de·--eloping economies in the late 1960's (see Table 9 for a 
summary). The ratio of patents granted to nationals to patents granted to 
nationals abroad 1anged from over 2.0 for many developing countries to around 
.1 for developing and slow growth semi-industrialized countries. 
The first r~tio ~s related to the level of development of the country 
in question and to its size and degree of economic integration with other 
Table 3: Industrial Design Patents and Trademarks Granted - 1975. 1980 
Industrial Designs Granted Trademarks Granted 
tfationals 1-'oreisncrs Nationals Forc-iP,nc-rs · 
1975 1980 1975 19d01975 19S0 1975 ill.Q. 
I. Industrial Market Economics 
A. Mo<lerate to Ral!id Growth 
Japan 34.129 30,696 700 593 104.156 41,577 5,010 50 290 
Austria 3,987 4,260 1,517 1. 744 1.458 3.333 1,247 2,148 
France 11,320 13,209 857 1,560 12,645 37,332 4,312 9,784 
Denmark 390 314 486 630 1,520 1,324 3,70~ 3,339 
Germany 54,231 70,701 2,609 4,844 9,396 13,006 3,432 3,838 
Benelux 1,671 1,691 1,376 1,262 5,529 4,418 3,571 . 3,082 
522 464 2.531 2,675Horway 243 252 364 434 
B. Slow Growth
Canada 337 337 1.168 978 3,507 8, 779 · 3,391 6,755 
Ireland 34 46 176 284 107 162 893 2,098 
Switzerland 465 351 213 325 2,552 2,462 1,508 1,507 
Sweden 1,283 1,558 364 588 1,397 1,577 2,591 2,608 
U.S.A. 3,428 3,056 854 892 28,353 17,319 2,378 1,566 
Australia 1,165 1,377 568 580 2,835 1,860 4,252 2,715 
V.K. 1,665 2,166 1,354 2,799 5,878 3,356 5,562 3,352
276 703 1,126 3,542Finland 165 371 222 350 
New Zealand 157 170 167 173 845 524 2,015 1,318 
II•. Semi~Industrialized 
A. Ra~id Growth 
224 407 11,119 12,822Spain 3,234 2,239 
Israel 115 266 42 56 224 255 1,064 863 
Greece 1,546 1,260 1, ~69 1,800
784 2,499Singapore
Portugal 266 335 216 228 770 1,035 481 581 
Brazil 136 81 136,808 42,821 
• Korea (R) 1,583 3,917 6 154 
348 603 1,182 1,647Bong Kong 
B. Moderate to Slow Growth 
Chile 2,883 1,986 2,810 1,735 
Venezuela 59 77 34 16 635 2,360 1,452 1,961 
Argentina 2,426 n.a. 159 u.a. 12,428 2,032 
Costa Rica 521 974* -
Mexico 
3,352 8,637 3.117 8,292* 
Turkey . .
55i* 1,129**1,171* 1,181*• 
Uruguay 
1,293 6,414 1,152 541 
111. Develo~-lng Economies 
210 513 6i2 1.0;7Ecuador
Iraq 19 9 68 184 236 885 
llon·occo 82 116 15 40 428 541 309 443 
U.A.R. (Egypt) 127 166 8 27 234 145 396 408 
Columbia 11 n.a. 5 n.a. 702 584**1.542 672 
Philippines 
151 a.a. 19 n.a . 539 1,225 341 1,013
.;. 153 443 585 747Eenya 
27 8 263 167Chana
India 723 n.a. 29 a.a. 3,019 n.a. 640
Sri Lanka 8 a.a. - n.a. 43 160 130 njf6 
Indonesia 1.160 6,479 697 2,741 
.Pakistian 74 93 14 36 283 494** 640 78cf 
Zalllbia 
3 .. 22 4 •u 215
OAPI 26 57 - 62 n.a. 954 n.a. 
ur. Planned Economies
Germany 1::. 299 150 325 265 
Czechoslovakia 577 1,304 8 20 182 134 302 . 258 
USSR 48 1,627 5 . 559 
Hungary 165 120 11 28 107 149 290 194 
Poland 139 124 16 28 288 116 040 544 
Bulgaria 27 38 5 6 15 73 ,34 492 
Yugoslavia 102 n.a. 30 a.a. 156 a.a. J.54 n.a. 
llomania 205 418 '.)34 53 




countries (particularly for E.E.C. members and Canada and the U.S.). It is 
-relevant, however, to this discussion because it indexes to some extent techno­
logy trade between countries. A firm has an incentive to obtain patent pro­
tection in a second country either because it is exporting products protected 
by the patent to the second country, producing such products in the second 
country or selling technology directly through a licensing or technical 
agreement. The cost of obtaining patents abroad will be a factor in the 
firm's decision to patent abroad as will the expected market for the protected 
invention. 
The ratio o:f patents granted to nationals to total patents has risen 
in most rapidly growing economies and declined iu most slow growing economies. 
For example,in th~ U.S. the· ratio fell from .78 in 1967 to .60 in 1980. In 
Japan it rose from .66 to .82 over the same period. This can be taken to be 
an index of changing comparative advantage. Table 4 presents patent (trade) 
"balance" data for 1967 and 1980. These data are organized to present the 
perspective of the granting country (i.e., _row proportions sum to one). 
These data show that the great bulk of the foreign patents granted in all 
co~tries, whether i~dustrial, semi-industrial, or planned, originate in 
industrial countries. Even the Eastern European planned economies grant 
the bulk of their patents to foreigners to Western European inventors. 
The dominancr-.: of industrial countries in terms of origination of patents 
granted abroad reflects their general comparative advantage in invention, parti­
cularly of the pioneering type. The second ratio which could be obtained from 
Table 1 illustrates the point. The ratio of pat~nts granted to nationals 
abroad to patents g~anted to nationals at home 13 a rough index of the degree 
of "pioneeringne~.s" or "adaptiveness" of invention. It is affected by size of 
country and proximatily of similar countries (as in the E.E.C) and thus is not 
an ideal index. It varies so markedly between industrial countries (around 2) and· 
Table- 4. Patent Balance Data 1967 and 1980: Perspective of Granting Country 
Patent Percent Originating In 















· Planr.~d !nd-..=trfol 




Japan 6,896 8,074 .49 .49 .09 .06 .16 .05 - - .25 .31 .01 .04 - .002 
Austria 3,920 4,481 .21 .13 .07 .04 .09 .46 .02 .04 .66 .27 .09 .• OS - .02 .01 .002 
France 31,749 19,622 · .34 .28 .11 .07 .24 .26 .04 .10 .21 .21 .OS .05 .01 .03 ~ .001 
Denmark 1,997 1,453 .23 .22 .11 .09 .22 .23 .02 .06 .39 .37 - .02 .03 .01 .08 - .002 
Gerr...:::..-.j• •· 8,300 10,362 .41 ·.31 .12 .06 - - .04 .23 .37 .32 .OS .OS .01 .03 - .001 
Belgium na 5,081 na .32 na .04 na .17 na .06 na .38 na .03 na .03 na .001 
Norway 1,817 1,843 .26 .23 · .11 .08 .19 .15 .• 02 .OS .SO .47 .005 .02 .005 .004 .006 .001 
Netherlands 1,913 2,907 .31 .30 .10 .05 .22 .21 .02 .15 .32 .26 .02 .02 - - .01 .006 







































Switzerland 16,462 4,486 .22 .22 .08 .05 .38 .32 .02 .09 .27 .27 .02 .04 .01 .006 - .001 
Sweden 7,532 3,604 .32 .29 .10 .06 .25 .22 .01 .07 .28 .32 .03 .04 - .003 .01 .001 
U.S.A. 14,378 24,675 - - .19 .09 .26 .14 .10 .25 .40 .53 .02 .03 .02 .02 .01 .001 
U.K. 28,893 18,646 .47 .36 - - .24 .21 .07 .12 .16 .28 .01 .01 .04 .02 .01 
Finland 739 1,464 .20 .18 .05 .07 .17 .20 .01 .04 .53 .39 .03 .09 .005 .02 .003 .01 
II. Semi-Industrial 
Spain 6,827 7,739 .27 .25 .08 .07 .17 .20 .01 .OS .45 .40 .01 .02 .004 .007 .01 .001 
Israel 935 1,419 .39 .46 .10 .09 .13 .16 .01 .02 .35 .26 .01 .Ol .01 .001 .001 .001 
Greece 1,319 942 .29 .21 .06 .08 .12 .22 .02 .03 .46 .38 .03 .OS .02 .02 .001 .01 
Portugal 1,038 2,200 .18 .23 .ll .08 .19 .17 .01 .03 .45 .42 .005 .01 .OS .OS .01 .01 
Korea 152 1,446 .45 .26 .02 .04 .28 .08 - .so· .24 .09 - .02 - .002 .007 .01 
Brazil 6 79 6,228 • 42 • 36 • 08 • 04 .13 • 22 •01 • 06 • 32 •30 •001 • 01 • 03 • 01 •01 • 001 
Chile 1,224 na .46 na .07 na .12 na .03 na · .26 na .Ol na .04• na .007 
Venezula 961 408 .59 .47 .04 .04 .05 .11 .03 .03 .28 .23 - .01 .Ol .09 .001 .02 
Argentina 4,479 na .50 na .08 · na .08 na .Ol na .31 na .005 na .01 na .008 
Mexico 5,817 2,389 .44 .62 - .03 .05 .02 .10 .03 .31 .26 .06 .Ol .04 · .02 - .07 
.Turkey 427 - .29 - .12 - .21 - .002 - .33 - .04 - .007 
Uruguay 350 236 .41 .24 .08 .12 • .13 .13 .02 .02 .22 .31 .01 .01 .12 .15 .009 .01, 
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semi-industrial countries (.15 to .25) and developing countries (.1) that no 
reasonable adjustment for these factors would alter the picture. Invention in 
developing countries is almost entire!~ adaptive in nature. Some of the more 
advanced semi-industrial economics (Spain, Israel, Brazil) appear to have 
significant pioneering invention but they are still predominately adaptive. 
The data from the planned economies are more difficult to interpret as they 
may be subject to considerable domestic policy effec~s. --- · · · 
The picture that emerges overall from these data is one that shows 
significant technology trade. It also shows differentiation 
of invention along a pioneering-adaptive continuum. Developing and semi.­
industrialized countries are overwhelmingly importers of technology and they 
specialize in adaytive invention at home. The jockeying for position among 
developed country exporters has changed somewhat in the past four years with 
Japan moving into a strong competitive position. The U.S. share of patent 
exports fell from .37 in 1967 to .30 in 1979. Japan's share rose from .03 
to .11. 
The notion that developing countries engage in mostly adaptive invention 
suggests that i..•wentior.s made in more highly developed countries "disclose" 
possibilities for modifications of these inventions in the developing countries 
economic laboratories • The inter?retation of adaptiveness of this 
invention is not ~hat easy to make, however. Clearly this invention is of a 
different charact~r than that made'by developed countries. It is apparently of 
low value "upstre:..m" in countries with high wages and which differ in other 
characteristics. Since these countries do obtain some patents abroad it will be 
useful to look at t~e patterns of this invention. 
Table 5 pro••ides data organized from the perspective of the origin cou11try 
for 1980. It is not surprising that most patenting abroad is in.the developed 
- countries. This is where the large markets are. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 
Table 5. Patent Balance Data 1980: Perspective of Origin Country 
Patents Originated 
Grantin~ Countri~~ - Region 
Other . Latin 
Sexni-·In<l..istr la~ _ Develv!;!ing 
Latin 






















































Belgium ( l, 720) 
l'forway ( 549) 
Netherlands ( 5,964) 
Canada ( 2,200) 
Italy ( 5,877) 
Ireland ( 107) 
Switzerland ( 9,827) 






















































































































































































































































however, do appear to be patenting downstream in Latin American developing 
countries to a significant extent. This provides some support for the 
adaptiveness hypotheses but a full treatment would require detailed industry 
data. 7 
Data on receipt of royalties and fees to U.S. residents for the use 
of intangible property such as patents, techniques, process designs, trade­
marks and other technology related activities show that the export of techno­
logy is not a trivial activity. Total receipts of royalties and fees were 
5.5 billion dollars in 1978.8 Product trade data also show that exports of 
R & D intensive p"l'."oducts have been important to the U.S. economy. In 1964_, 
the trade balance in R & D intensive manufactured products showed net exports 
of ~8.8 billion ar,d net imports of $3.7 billion in non-R & D intensive manu­
factured products. In 1979,net exports of R & D intensive manufactured 
· products had grow~ to $39.3 billion but net mports of non-R·& D intensive 
products had grow.1 to $34.8 billion. (These data do not include agricultural 
and mineral products which are also important in trade). 
III. Evidence of Declining Patent/Inventive Input Ratios 
We now turn to four sets of data on patents and inventive inputs (scientists 
and engineers eng~ged in R & D and R &D spending) to examine the question of 
"inventor product~vity". All four bodies of data show that the ratio 
of patents granted per unit of inventive input has fallen from 1964 to 1979-80. 
This decline show~ up for almost ail of the industries in the two data sets 
(U.S. and Japan) •,here industry specific data are available. It shows up in 
each of the five ~olllltries for which OECD data are available (U.S., U.K., France, 
West Germany and Japan), and it shows up in most of the 44 countries for which 
UNESCO data are available. 
A decline in the ratio of patents granted to inventive inputs need not 
imply that real invention per unit of inventive input has declined. A change 
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in the "propensity to patent" i.e., patents granted per unit of real in-
vention, could have pr?duced the results reported here. A rise in the cost 
of obtaining and enforcing patents, changes in legal systems and changes in 
company policies could produce changes in the propensity to patent. We know that 
some such changes have almost certainly occurred particularly because of rising 
patent enforcement costs. A few countries have changed their legal systems as 
well. However, many countries have not experienced rises in patent enforcement 
costs and have actively encouraged invention through subsidies and favorable 
tax treatment. It would be extremely unlikely that changes in the propensity 
to patent could explain the universal decline in patenting per inventive inpur. 
9unit shown by the data•. 
• 
Consider first the data by industry for the United States. Table 6 prov5.des 
the most detailed industry data readily available on patents granted to natio:-1als 
and foreigners as well as R & D (in 1972 constar. t dollars) and scientists and 
engineers engaged in R &D. Data on the proportion funded by government an1 
on the proportion considered "basic" and "development" are also provided by t~1e 
N.S.F. 
Table 6 shows that R &D spending per scientist and engineer, while vary~ng somewr. 
by industry, has changed little from 1964 to 1976. It increased at an annual 
rate of only .0047. Patenting per scientist and engineer fell at an annual rate 
of -.0126 from 1964-6 to 1971-2 and -.0439 from 1971-2 to 1976-8. (~.0283 over 
the entire period). Regression 1 provides a statistical description of this 
Table 6. lnd~try Patenting, R & D Expenditures and Scientists and Engineers.~. U.S.A.- 1964-78 
Anm1al. Pcrc:mt Ch:ir.g.::::: J.r.nu.:ll P.::.:-.::ent Chan&es 
Ratios 1976-8 1964-6 to 1971-2 1971-2 to 1976-8 
R & D PN PN PN PN R & D 'PN PN PN R & D 
Industry S & E -S & E -PF S&E R & D S & E PF S&E R & D . S & E PN/PF' 
Food 40.2 86.3 2.10 .057 .034 .023 -.065 -.039 .039 ·.001 -.027 
Textiles 33.7 241.1 1.35 .021 .036 -.015 -.084 -.014 -.094 .040 "!".066 
All Chemicals 50.3 159.1 1.38 -.018 -.016 -.002 -.068 -.030 -.038 · .008 -.047 
Industrial Chemicals 56.9 173.l 1.35 .017 .014 .002 -.055 -.031 -.081 .011 -.039 
Drugs ·47 .1 71.0 1.06 -.093 -.078 -.016 -.034 .010 .005 .005 -.057 
Petroleum Products 69.2 84.2 4.14 -.031 -.099 -.010 -.036 -.007 -.036 .033 -.070 
Rubber Products 42.7 276.7 1.89 -.029 -.072 .043 -.098 -.006 -.081 -.020 -.054 
Stone and Glass 42.5 214.2 1.84 -.018 .001 -.019 -.123 -.076 -.078 .002 -.054 
Primary Metals 46.2 55.7 1.11 -.040 -.009 -.030 -.088 -.089 -.094 .005 -.061 
Fabricated Metals 37.9 766.2 2.17 -.002 -.049 ~038 -.086 -.064 -.063 -.002 -.046 
Non-electric Machines 49.9 206.5 1.54 -.074 -.108 -.015 -.077 -.100 -.110 .010 -.057 
Electric Machines 52.2 100.1 l.78 .009· .002 .006 -.082 -.046 -.051 .005 -.062 
I 
Motor Vehicles 79.4 95.5 l.91 -.029 -.021 -.005 -.061 -.034 -.060 .025 -.025 
0\ Aircraft 66.6 13.0 1.21 .041 .054 -.013 -.061 .023 .021 .003 -.062..-i 
I Scientific and 
Professional 
Instruments 52.4 253.2 1.67 .001 -.030 .029 ·-.094 -.097 -.048 -.007 -.056 
All 51.2. 186.4 l.77 -.0126 -.0138 .0011 -.0742 -.0439 -.0529 .· .0082 --.0523 
Regressions: 
- (1) LN(PN/S & E) :a 5.0986 + Ind. Dummies - .0756 T2 - .3392 T3 (R2 • .947, F • 38.27) 
(.105) (.105) ,(. 
(2) LN(PN) • 5.0147 + 1.18 LN(S & E) + 2.526 Proportion Govt. Funded - 13.91 Proportion Basic 
(.166) (1.058) (10.97) 
+ 1.419 Proportion Development+ Ind. Dummies - .132 T2 - .~f33 T3 (R2 • .97 F .512)
(.98) (.106) (.130 
(3) LN(PN) • .107 + 1.23 LN (R & D) + 1.93 Proportion Govt. Funded - 13.77 Proportion Basic 
(.15) (1.00) (10.15) 
+ 1.38 Proportion Development+ Ind. Dummies -.155 'X2 - .526 T3 
(.55) . (.099) (.126) 
Source: Science Indicators 1980 
T2 • l if year equals 1971 
T3 • l if year equals 1978 
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decline controlling for industry effects. The annual rates are unch~nged by 
the correction for industry effects and the decline from 1964-6 to 1976-8 is 
highly significant from a statistical perspective. These data do not include 
patenting for 1979 and 1980. At the national level patents granted to national 
inventors declined by 10.2% from 1976-8 to 1980 (this excludes the extraordinarily 
low patenting in 1979). Numbers of scientist and engineers and R & D expenditures 
rose by roughly 10 percent during this period. (In the Table 6 data, R & D and 
scientists and engineers numbers are lagged behind patents granted by 2 years). 
Had the data included these latter two years, the decline would have been 
substantially greater than shown here. 
Since R & D spending rose relative to scientists and engineers only slightly, 
patents granted per dollar spent on R & D declined only slightly more than is 
the case for scient'"lsts and engineers. The table alsp shows that the ratio of 
national to foreign patenting fell in every industry in both periods. It is of 
interest, however, to note that the change in this ratio is positively correl.:tted 
with the change in labor productivit¥ across L~dustries over the 1966-78 peri0d . 
(r = .583). There is also a positive correlati,>n 
between the change in the national to foreign pacent ratio and the change in 
national patentine per scientist and engineer (.346 over the entire period, .~56 
in the second half). Changes in national patenting and foreign patenting are 
positively correlated for the 1966-78 period (r = .701) but changes in nati~n~l 
patenting in the se-cond half of the period are negatively correlated with cha11ges 
in foreign patenting in the first period (r = -.631). The reverse is also tr,1e 
10 
(r C .342). 
Regressions (2~ and (3) in Table 6 report a simple effort to control for some 
characteristics of the research system on patenting per unit of inventive input. 
They provide some evidence that government funding increases inventive output 
while emphasis on basic research decreases it. 
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Our second set of data reported in Table 7 includes industry level data 
for Japan. These data show that patent applications per scientist an~ engineer 
were lower in 1975-6 than in 1967-8 in all industries except textiles and foods 
where they were unchanged. Patent applications per dollar expended on R & D 
also declined because R &D per scientist rose. (R &D spending is expressed 
in millions of 1970 constant yen). It is of interest to note that a positive 
correlation between the changes in patents per scientists and engineers exists 
between the U.S. and Japan with the transport (motor vehicles) and non-electric 
machinery industries in both countries experiencing the largest declines. 
Table 8 reports our third data set. T.hese data were collected by the O~~CD 
and are somewhat more reliable than the fourth data set collected by UNESCO 
•(summarized in Table 9). The five countries included in the table actually 
The decline in patents granted toundertake the bulk of the world's R &D. 
national inventors per scientist and engineer (the scientist and engineer and 
R & D data are iagged 2 years prior to the patenting data, i.e., for the 1967 
column S & E and R &D data are for 1965) shows up in each country. In the 
cases of Japan and Germany patents per sciejtist and engineer peaked in 
1971. In the U.S., U.K. and France,.this ratio has declined since 1967. IL 
terms of the date of investment in R & D, these declines set in two years 
not directly associatedearlier. It seems quite clear then that the decline was 
with the energy price increases of the early 1970s. 
The data on R & D and Industrial Product (IDP) have been first deflate<.'. 
by national GDP deflators to 1971 values then converted to U.S. dollars utillz-
. 11. 
ing the adjusted e~change rate of Kravis, Sunnners and Heston. We really do not 
have an ideal deflator for R & D spending in any single country nor do we have 
an ideal exchange rate. The procedure adapted here is about the best one can 
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Table 7. Patent Applications, Scientists and Engineers and R &D 
Expenditures in Japan 1967-1976 
Industrr Patents/S & E Patents/R &D R & D/S & E 
1967-8 1971-2 1975-6 1967-8 1971-2 1975-6 1967-8 1971-2 1975-6 
6,969 6,528Chemicals 1.60 1.30 1.42 .425 .187 .218 3,762 
Non-Electrical 
Machinery 3.28 2.66 2.33 .948 .422 .273 2,914 11,402 4,714 
Electric and 
Electrical 
Machinery 1.23 .93 1.12 .378 .132 .197 3,251 7,042 5,667 
· Transport and 
Construction 
Equipment 2.08 1.49 1.32 .328 .136 .110 6,332 10,959 11,832 
Textile and 
4,954Household Goods ·4.82 5.54 4.89 1.413 1.071 .988 3,412 5,169 
Foods 1.37 .84 1.38 .494 .:69 .270 2,778 4,949 5,108 · 
All Industries 1.60 1.43 1.54 .733 .200 .236 3,610 7,150 6,540 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Japan 
• 
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Table 8. OECD Data: Patents; R & D; Scientists and Engineers 
Patents Scientists 
to and Roialties and Fees 
Nationals Engineers PN PN R & D Received Paid 
PN S & E S & E R & D IDP Received Paid PNA PF 
United States 
1967 51,274 494.5 103.8 2.85 · 2.49 23.84 2.28 .32 .16 
1971 55,988 555.2 100.8 3.145 2.12 31.91 3.02 .36 .14 
1975 44,162 525.1 84.1 2.484 1.98 28.96 3.19 • 32 .12 
1980 37,652 573.9 65.6 2.341 1.91 26.89 2.55 .49 .14 
United Kingdom 
1967 9,807 49.9 196.5 7.36 2.00 2.51 2.38 .14 .08 
1971 10,376 52.8 196.5 8.45 1.85 3.61 3.28 .17 .11 
1975 8,855 80.7 109.7 8.75 1.75 3.32 2.73 .24 .09 
1980 5,158 80. 7 63.8 5.23 1.82 na na na 
West Germani 
1967 5,126 61.0 84.0 2.30 1.28 1.24 2.64 .03 .31 
1971 8,295 74.9 110.7 2.23 1.54 1.53 3.94 .04 .40 
1975 10,395 102.S 101.4 2.69 1.59 1.73 3.85 .05 .36 
1980 
!. 
9,826 111.0 88.5 2.29 1.64 1.91 4.64 .06 .40 
France 
. 1967 15,246 42.8 356.2 10.44 1.42 2.68 3.16 .19 .10 
1971 13,696 57.2 239.4 7.90 1.29 4.42 4.59 .26 .12 
1975 8,420 64.1 131.4 4.07 1.39 6.54 5.44 .51 .25 
1980 8,433 68.0 124.0 3.61 1.35 9.19 7.42 .73 .42 
.JaEan 
·1967 13,877 117.6 118.0 9.67 .84 .37 3.28 .06 .47 
1971 24,795 157.1 157.8 7.70 1.11 .75 6.12 .05 .52 
1975 32,465 238.2 136.3 8.49 1.19 1.01 4.79 .05 .63 
· 1980 38,032 272.0 139.8 8.50 1.29 1.33 5.85 .07 .63 
·source: Scie~ce Indicators 1980 
' 
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can do with the data at hand and the reader should be very cautious in 
toattempting to interpret ratios of patents or scientists and engineers 
R & D spending. (The deflation problem does not affect the ratio of R .& D 
to Industrial Product). 
Bearing this in mind we may note that the general pattern of de~lining 
_:t 
patenting per unit of investment in R & D emerges from the data.although some 
When R & D spending per S & E declines, patentsdifferences in detail are apparent. 
per R & D rise (and vice-versa). This has operated to alter the peaks in 
PN/R & D relative to PN/S & E. 
The data on the percent of indu~trial product expended in industrial 
R & D show this n.tio to be declining sharply in the U.S. and rising signi­
ficantly in Japan and West Germany. In 1980, these five countries did not 
differ greatly on this measure. 
We also have data on royalties and fees paid and received for these 
five countries (e:-.:.pressed in "real" U.S. dollars as was R & D). The ratios 
of royalties and fees received per patent granted to nationals abroad are 
relatively low fc1· West Germany and Japan while the reverse is true for the 
~atio of payments ma.de per patent granted for foreigners. These two countries 
are the "aggressive" countries with regard to expanding their R & D investments 
and patenting in foreign countries. Their strategy h~s generally been to borrow 
or import techn~lc,gy aggressively to build their own capacity. This appears to 
. 
be reflected in the fact that they pay substantial fees for imported technology 
and receive relat:vely low payments for their patenting abroad presumably be­
cause they are ea1 ly entrants in these markets·. 12 · 
Obviously, tr._ese ratios are only rough proxies for the real prices paid and 
received or the real value of patents. It may be noted that these ratios hav~ 
Does this mean that the real economic value of alltended to rise ov~r time. 
·patents has risen? If so, the decline in patenting per scientist and engineer 
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may be partially offset by a rising value per patent. This is difficult to 
say because the patents involved in "trade" are generally the most valuable 
patents. Changes in the volume of trade will affect the relative proportions 
The average value of patents involved·•· of high.,..valued to low-valued patents. 
in trade could rise even though the average value of all patents remained 
unchanged. 
· Table 9 provides a summary of international data for 44 countries (see 
Table 1 for classification by region). Lines 1 through 5 provide means of 
patent and trademark data reported in Tables 1 and 3 by region. These 
figures highlight the major features of the patent data. They show the 
decline in the importance of the U.S. in world patenting and the rise in 
importance of Japcn, West Germany and the planned economies. They also 
show the marked d:.fferences in patents granted abroad to patents granted 
at home - a measure of adaptiveness of invention--between the industrialized 
nations and the.: f,P.mi-industrailized and developing economies. They further 
show the high deg_:--ee of foreign patenting in most of the world's economies. 
' Lines 6 - 9 provide data on ratios of patenting to numbers of scientists 
and engineers in the productive sector and on patenting to R & D expenditures 
-in the productiv(;: sector.. It should be noted that both the S & E data and the 
R & D data are subject to considerable errors. The UNESCO data provide a break-
down of both. -:o:r: . the "productive",(i.e. industry, transport, commerce). 
education and se.rvice sectors. !or purposes of this paper I have used data for 
.. ✓--
the productive se~tor. A further problem with these data is that they are not 
13 
available for al1. years and some interpolation was required. The most serious 
problem, however, is the exchange rate conversion. This conversion is relevant . 
only if one wishes to make cross-section comparisons. Comparisions over tic~ 
require only an a11propriate deflator to convert expenditures to a constant 
currency unit. Line 8 provides R & D data in constant 1972 U.S. dollars where stancu 
Table 9. Intern~tional Data:_ Patanting and Invention Inputs Means by Re~,ion by Period 
Industrialized Eccnomies Semj-tndustrilllb,ed Ecc11omics Developing ilannad 
Rapid Growth USA Other Rapid-Moderate Slow Growth Economies Economies-
1. Share of Worlds 
Invention Patents 
1967-71 .251 .316 .110 .026 .017 .004 .277 
1976-79 .310 .233 .075 .033 .010 .004 .336 
2. Share of Worlds 
Design Patents 
1975-80 .852 .025 .041 .046 .017 .010 .029 . 
3. Share of Worlds 
Trademarks 
1975-80 .412 .080 .064 .309 .092 .036 .007 
I 
;) 4. Ratio: Patents granted"I to Nationals Abroad 
to Patents (N) 
1967-71 1.94 1.51 2.28 .28 .092 . .10 .155 
1976-79 1.31 1.69 2.65 .20 • 165 .09 .109 
5. Ratio: Patents (N) 
to Total Patents 
1967-71 •39 .75 .19 .25 .17 .11 .76 
1976-79 .51 .62 .18 .21 .20 .12 .84 
• 
6. Patents Per Scientist &Engineer (PN/SE)' 
. 
1967 : .238 .248 .998 .380 .053
1971 .258 ( .08) .214 (-.11) .•876 ( .12) . .337 (-.02) 
.269 
.066 ( .08) .218 (-.07)1976 .201 (-.14)* .152 (-.36)** .494 (-.12) ., .185 (-.69)** .055 ( ..• 13). .187 ( .28)*1979 .200 (-.09) .108 (-.6g)** ·,.550 ( .05) .1s4 c-.98)** .052 ( .02) .243 (-.08) 
., 
Table 9. International Data: Patenting and Invention Inputs Means by Region by Period 
(continued) 
Industrialized Economies Semi-Industrialized Developing Planned 
Ra£id Growth Slow Growth Ra£id Growth Slow Growth Economies· Economies 
···-·-·-- -
7. Patents Per Dollar Expended R &.D (PN/R &D)1,2 
1967-711.007 1.660 4.054 '-· -· 3.429 .340 l.0921975-79 1.276 1.463 6xso3 2.181. .337 l.297 
8. Patents Per Dollar Expended R &D (PN/R & D)l. 
......1967-711.276 1.,775 . -6.799 6.858 •777 l.0921975-79 1.119 l. 2·02 9.733 3.621 .822 1.297 
19. R & D/GDP 
1967 .0325 .0230 .0094 .0040 .0056 .03571971 .0227 (-.38)** .0168 (-.29)** .0056 (-.53)** .00431 ( .13)1976 .0206 (-.48)** .0159 .0053 (-.05) .0261 {-.26)**(-.36)** .0043 (-.77)**1979 .0196 (-.52)** .0111 c-.Jo)** 
.0041. (-.16) .004·1 c-.26>** .0331 c-.os>•.0043 c-.1s>•• .0041. (-.16) .0039 (-.27)** .0329 ,-.11)* 
10. Regression of LN(R & D) on: 
LN(MFG} 1.032** 1.25** .627* -.124 .301* .767*Industrial 
Growth. -.0025 -.040 -.014 -.133~: .050** .035Trade 
2ntensity 2. 722** -1.45* • .55 -3.3G1: -l.45i.R .99 
238 
.99 .98 •96 .97 .99 --· ]69 '61F 25 55 160 
Note: Country and time dummies included in regressions. 
*Coefficient> 1.5 times standard error;** Coefficient> 2 times standard error 
l} Numbers in parentheses are time dummy coefficients in a regression LN () on country and time dummies. 
2) These R &D data are deflated by the Kravis, Summers, and Hesten p11rchasing power exchange rate. 
Source of Data: UNESCO Yearbooks. 
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exchange rate conversions to dollars were made and where the U.S. deflater was 
applied. Linc 6 utilizes the purchasing power parity exchange rates developed 
by Kravis, Heston and Summers (1980). This deflater modifies both the time series 
and cross-section aspect of the conversion and,while imperfect for the task at 
hand.is probably the best available. 
·' 
Examination of the data in line 6 shows that patents per scientist and 
engineer have declined in the industrialized and slow_growing semi-industrialized 
countries (which account for most of the world's patents - see line 1). The numbers 
in parentheses are regression estimates of the decline in the ratios within countries 
(i.e., country dummies were included in the regrer.sions). Statistically significant 
declines are shown for the last two periods relative to the first for these groups. 
In addition virtually all individual countries in each group showed declines in the 
ratios. These ratios do vary considerably by type of economy with the semi-
1.J:ldustrialized cour1tries (notably the rapid growth SIC's) showing ratios far above 
the industrial cow:.try standard. Developing colu1tries are generally far below the 
industrial countri~s in this regard. 
It would appear that standards of·patentability must be somewhat lower in 
the semi-industrialized economies. It is also the case that these economies 
concentrate their inventive efforts in industrieH with high PN/S & E ratios -
(see Tables 6 and 7, textiles, foods, non-electdcal machinery). ·The decline 
in the ratio may b~ partially due to shifts in R &D toward industries with gen­
erally lower ratios. In developing·countries, a relatively high proportion of 
time may be devote~ to adaptive invention, much of which is not patentable in 
these countries. }I.any of these countries have ve-nted frustration over the terms 
on which technology fs purchased in international fora. Few have shown imagination 
in developing l~gal systems suited to their competitive position in international 
invention. These data indicate that most invention from these countries is 
\ 
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'adaptive. They are not generally able to compete in the primary market for 
invention. Yet they have generally not modified their patent system to encourage 
adaptive invention. They have instead opted to weaken the scope of patent cover­
age and administratively to discourage foreign patenting. In this the slow-growth 
industrial economies and the developing economies have been successful. Unfor­
tunately, they have also discouraged national invention in the process. 
The data on patents per dollar expended on R &Dare somewhat less regular 
in showing declines in patenting per unit of inventive activity than are the data 
on patents per scientist and engineer. Part of this is due to the problem of de­
flating these data appropriately. The data show g~neral declines in patenting per 
dollar expended in R &D except in the rapidly growing semi-industrial economies, 
the planned economies and for the data deflated by the purchasing power parity 
exchange rate for the rapidly growing industrial economies. Some of this departure 
from the pattern sh0wn in line 6 is probably due to efficiencies in the organization 
. 14 
of R & Din some of the rapidly growing economies. 
Line 9 of the table corroborates the pattern observed in the OECD countries 
regarding the decline in the share of industrial product devoted to R & D. This 
share has declined in virtually all countries in the data set including the planned 
economies •.The fact that this has happened is con,istent with the proposition that 
it has become more r.ostly to invent, i.e., that the probability of discovery has 
declined. The magnitude of this decline in investment is highly significant and has 
important policy imp:ications for gr?wth when considered along with the evidence for 
declining productivity of invention. 
Table 9 also reports a~ investment regress•ion for each of these regions. It is 
more "descriptive" in nature than analytical. In aach region the log of R &Dis 
. regressed on the lob ~f industrial GDP, the industrial growth rate in the previous ten 
years and the trade intensity of the country (i.e., the ratio of the value of t~ade to 
GDP). Country and time durrany variables are includ~d to pickup constant country 
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effects. These regressions, while not particularly remarkable given the data 
and the problem of international comparability,suggest that investment decisions 
are reasonably systematic. Except for the slow growing semi-industrial economies, 
a rather mixed bag of countries, investment in R & Dis related to industry size. 
There is little evidence that past industry growth affects investment decisions 
(although this might differ if we had detailed industry data). Openness to trade 
appears to have a positive effect on R & D spending in the fast growing economies 
and a negative effect in the slow growing economies. ·The interpretation of this 
result is not readily obvious since openness to trade and willingness to invest 
in R &D may be jointly determined by a set of political factors. It is tempting 
to suggest that aggressive growth strategies, as by Japan and West Germany, produce 
this positive correlation while the reverse is true for those countries pursuing 
less aggressive growth policies. This type of data, however, is not really suited 
to testing that proposition and these regressions are accordingly presented here in 
a data table and labelled descriptive.-15 -
The case for cc,ncluding that a significant decline in real productivity of 
invention has taken place does not require that we show that no change in the pro­
pensity to patent occurred. The magnitude of the declines in patenting per scientist 
and engineer and per unit of R &Din the OECD countries for which we have gooc'. data 
is large. Furthermore, these countries have reduced spending on R & D relative to 
the market for inver..tions by significant amounts. · It is also not surprising that a 
decline in invention potential should have occurred. Broad cycles in growth pctential 
have marked our hisLory before. It may well be that the 1970s were more normal in 
· this regard than the 1950s and 1960s. 
Our data force as to deal with broad aggregat~s. Had we more detailed data by 
technology field we would find that even prior to 1965 many technology fields were 
exhibiting declines in invention potential. This is true in the 1970s as well. 
It is just that the declines are outweighing the increases. One 
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need only to look at detailed patenting data by sub-class to note cycles. 
Patenting activity may be sporadic for a period: (then increa~e to a peak and 
then decline). Of the patent sub-classes utilized in the U.S. Patent Office 
today, the majority are considered "dead art", i.e., patenting activity bas ceased. 
The natural model underlying these data is a search model in which a pool 
of p·otential invention is determined by existing technical and scientific know­
ledge. The pool is depleted by inventive activity. It is recharged in various 
ways. Other related inventive activity can recharge pools through disclosure 
effects. More basic scientific and technical research can produce findings which 




Its purpcse has been to 
. 
identify broad indicators of change in the 
invention processes. 
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IV. Implications for Studies of Technology 
Most studies of the economic determinants of R & D spending by firms 
or of the economic outcomes attendant to that spending have not taken ~rade 
effects into account. Many studies have implicitly, if not explicitly, 
supposed that firms do not have the option to purchase new technology directly, 
except in "embodied" form in capital goods. In addition, many studies presume 
that the probability of discovery from a firn's R & Dis constant over signif­
icant periods of time. Most studies recognize that industry specific effects 
may be present in this probability, but few make any attempt to take into 
account the degree of adaptability of the R & D and its dependence on discoveries 
made by other firms including international firms. 
The data summarized in this paper as well as the evidence on "overseas F. & D" 
•
undertaken by U.S. multinational firms ·suggest that'for many problems the it:ter-
national dimension cannot be easily set aside..1
7 . Many firms have international 
R & D strategies with laboratories located in different markets and economic 
Virtually all R & D activities have some elements of adaptiveuessenvironments. 
and the probability of discovery will depend on the fact that other firms ar1~ 
making closely related discoveries. Studies based on a sample of only large firms 
in one industry (or industries) such as many in this volume do not provide a 
realistic picture of industry equilibria regarding R & D strategy. Even in these 
large firms the variation in R & D spending has been noted to be much higher than 
for normal factors of production.
18· Had the entire industry been sampled, we would 
find that some firms in some industries engage in practically no formal R & ;1. 
Yet they exist in competitive equilibrium with other firms engaging in signiiicant 
levels of R & D. 
International data show this pattern of high variation in formal spendi.~g 
on R & D across countries. They also show that the degree of adaptiveness of 
R & D is highly correlated with the level of R & D spending. A further piece 
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of evidence suggesting that significant trade in technology takes place 
is that many patented inventions are granted to individuals with no associ­
ation with firms or with associations with very small firms. This would not 
occur to a very significant degree if it were not possible to sell invented 
technology in forms disembodied from a product. 
The patent system is often seen primarily as a means by which a firm 
can prevent infringement on the technology which it has discovere_d and is 
using in production. A well-functioning patent system has two further aspects 
of importance. First, patent systems enable the exchange of technology by 
providing the basis for legal transactions. Second, the patent systems requ5.re 
an "enabling disclosure" which legal scholars regard to be of great importance. 
The removal from secrecy of inventions is seen to be the main social benefit off­
setting the cost of the limited monopoly granted. (Economists tend to stress• 
incentives for invention as the major benefits). We observe that when patent 
systems are functioning efficiently (i.e., the cost of obtaining and enforcing 
patent protection is low) it encourages technology trade. When patent systems 
are not efficien~ technology trade becomes closely integrated with product trade. 
For certain types of studies, the fact that technology can be purchased and 
sold, that R & D activities can vary in adaptiv~ness and that R & D productivity 
may be influenced by discover~es by other firms requires that we develop better 
"price" data for technology. It also requires that the alternative types of 
technology acquisition activities be better spe~ified than at present. We sl,ould, 
for example, be meRsuring a firm's investment in pioneering R & D, adaptive R & D, 
licensing and royalty payments, search costs for new designs, etc. if we are to 
· .- ..understand fully the firms investment motives. We should be at.tempting to d£fine 
. more meaningful prtee variables facing the firm. Technology embodied in capi.tal 
goods (or technical services) supplied by other firms is available at a real 
price and is a substitute for some types of R & D activity and quite possibly 
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complementary to highly adaptive R & D. Other technology can be licensed 
for a price. A firm'~ own technical capacity will affect the prices it pays. 
The supply side of these technology markets changes with new discoveries, etc • 
. 
Obviously, definiag proxies for these prices will require a good deal of 
imagination and probably a few good case studies. A few studies are showing 
progress on this score, however.-19 - ~-
The issue of changing invention productivity is of obvious importance 
independently of our interest in investigating firm behavior more clearly. 
If invention potential pools are being depleted more rapidly than they are 
being recharged, economic growth will suffer. If this depletion-recharge 
process differs significantly by industry and by economic environment, it 
has important implications for comparative adva~tage and incomes associated 
with it. The data reviewed•in this paper are in many ways too aggregative to 
: investigate adequately _the depletion-recharge i . ..;sue. They strongly suggest 
that the U.S. and a few other developed economies may have experienced a 
fairly broad scale net depletion of invention potential pools. Further, the 
international patterns of comparative advantage appear to have changed markedly 
in recent years. The two phenomena are related and their net effect on the U.S. 
economy in the past 15 years may have been quit:= significant. It is not unreason­
able to suppose that the potential economic groNth of the economy (setting aside 
macro-policy issues) may well have been considerably lower since 1965 or so than 
in the preceeding 15 to 20 years. 
It is also not unreasonable to suppose that some loss of international 
comparative advantage rents has been sustained ~y the economy. 
As economists investigate this issue policy attention will focus on the 
recharge mechanism, Progress toward measuring the effectiveness of alternative 
recharge strategies (basic research, scientific research, etc.) however, will depend 
our ability to specify the depletion mechanisms (i.e.,the invention process). 
Patent-data are now becoming available in more detailed form (IPC classes) and 
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for more countrieL;- They provide scope for both firm level and more aggregate 
trade-type studies. Application of interest in trade theory to the issue 
should help to sort out relevant issues. 
A final point can be made regarding patent system policy. International 
organizations have pressed strongly for the establishment of international 
agreements regarding intellectual property. These agreements are designed in 
part to achieve standardization of legal system treatment of intellectual property 
rights and to lower the costs of inter-country recognition of these rights. Impli­
citly, these international conventions seek to provide global (or as much of the 
globe as possible) property rights to inventors in a particular country. This may 
: be a perfectly reasonable trade agreement between certain countries (e.g •• Common 
Market countries). We have observed in this paper, however, that trade in intel­
lectual property is a very unequal trade with developing countries having a strong 
competitive disa~vantage in supplying intellectual property to developed country 
markets. Their inventors do not have the economic laboratories and other re­
sources to enable them to be competitive. 
Ironically, nations do not recognize global property rights in non-intellectual 
property and regularly intervene in commodity and capital trade markets to achieve 
nationalistic goals. With few exceptions, these same nations have joined inter­
,national conventions freely granting intellectmd property rights to citizens of 
other countries. By doing so they have gained some advantages in bargaining with 
multi-national firms and in some forms of techn0logy purchase. But unless the cost 
of "pirating" inventions is very high they have paid more than necessary for techno­
logy purchased from abroad. 
However, th~ most serious impact of membership in international conventions 
may well be that it restricts the flexibility of many countries to design legal 
systems tailored to their comparative advantage, particularly regarding adaptive 
invention and th~ encouragement of indigenous secondary technology core dev~lop­
ment. Petty patent systems appear to be one alternative, there are probably · 
others. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. A study by Wright and Evenson, 1980, reported that approximately 75 percent 
of the patents granted in specialized chemical fields (oils and food chemicals) 
are subsequently cited as next best art in other patents. 
2. The legal literature sees this enabling disclosure, which enables or induces 
further inventions by others, as an important part of the bargain in which mono­
poly rights are granted in return for disclosure. (Economists, by contrast, 
see invention incentives as the principal benefits obtained in the bargain). 
3. I will argue in the final section of this paper that membership in inter­
national conventions has been very costly (and unwise) for many countries. The 
cost of searching the world's patent and other literature to establish novelty 
is high and many small countries cannot adequately undertake this task. Further-
·more, the adherence to a strong international standard regarding the inventive 
step (3) requirement effectively removes patent protection from "adaptive" in-
ventions which are about the only types of inventions many developing 
countries can produce. 
4. These classifications are based on The World Development Report, 1980, World 
Bank, •August 1980. 
5. Patenting abroad is influenced by cost conPiderations. The European countries 
have recently introduced the Europatent which enables low cost patent protection 
in a group of member countries. This legal instrument will have important impli­
cations for future data interpretation but has nad little impact on the data 
reported here. Proximity of markets is also a factor in patenting abroad - parti­
cularly in the case of Canada and the United States. 
6. Table 4 indicates that a considerable part of patenting ab.road by The Planned 
Economies is in other planned economies althoubh most are granted in industrial~ 
ized countries. The planned economies also have ratios of patents granted to 
scientists and engineers that are comparable to those in industrial countries 
see Table 9. 
7. Such data are now becoming available from the International Patent Docu­
mentation Center, Vienna, Austria. Patents can be classified by International 
Patent Class (IPC). A concordance between IPC and Standard Industrial Classes 
has been made by INPADOC. F.M. Sherer (1981) has questioned the value of such 
condorda~ces, but for reasonably broad industrial classes they may be adequate. 
8. See Table 8 for data from several OECD countries in Royalties and Fees 
receipts and payments. 
9. The data utilized in Table 6 are summarized in Science Indicators 1980 (i981). 
10. The reader should bear ih mind that some variation in patents granted i~ due 
to changes in the "backlog" of patents applied for but not examined. A decline in 
patents granted in.period T due to an increase in th~ backlog will produce an 
increase in patents granted in a later period. 1979 was a particularly bad year 
in this .regard in the U.S. Patent Office and patenting was low because of an 
increase in the backlog. The 1979 data for the U.S., U.K. and France are not 
used in any of the calculations made in this paper because of this problem. 
11. The Kravis, Summers, Heston purchasing power parity exchange rate is designed 
to enable better comparability of incomes between countries. The real costr, of 
undertaking research may not be closely related to the real costs of producing 
goods generally. We do not have an ideal deflater for R & D spending in any single 
colllltry and obviously no ideal detlator exists to achieve cross-country comp·tra­
bility. This paper does not attempt to draw strong conclusions from cross-
country comparisons as a consequence. They are reported as a matter of con,Tcmience 
(but see footnote 12). 
12. This inference requires comparability in the real dollar conversions. lfuile 
expressing skepticism about conversion rates (see footnote 11), one can probably 
say that the problems are less serious for this group of countries than. for most 
others. 
13. UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks provide data for available years and it is 
not possible to match up the data for all relevant years. Simple interpolation 
was used to fill in missing years. The classification of R & D and S & E data 
by type of performing organization is also subject to some differences between 
countries. Personnel data are classified as scientists and engineers, techni­
cians and other personnel. The inclusion of technicians in the data reported in 
Table 9 would not have altered the results. 
14. A simple regression: 
= bLN(R & D/S & E) + country and time dummies was run for eachLN(PN/S & E) 
country group. The b coefficient was positive in all cases (usually 7.5) and 
greater than its standard error in all but the slow growing industrial countries. 
This indicates that R & D data are measuring real scientific resources rather than 
scientists' and engineers' time. The time dummy coefficients were similar to those 
reported in Line 6. 
15. The problem of shifts between industrieF j_s particularly.problematic for 
such comparisons. 
16. Kislev and Evenson (1975) apply a simple search model to R & D processes. 
Such models require some enrichment but may be a useful starting point for 
further study. 
17. See the paper by Edwin Mansfield in this volume. 
18. Pakes and Shankerman - this volume. 
19. Zvi Griliches (1981) discusses a number of the relevant issues. Some of 
the papers in this volume - notably Mansfield (1981) and Ben-Zion (1981) reflect 
concern for these points. 
20. The richest data set is that provided by IN'PADOC, Vienna,.Austria. Patents 
50 countries are riow available f.or recent years. One can traceby IPC for some 
families of patents (i.e., the same patent granted in a number of different 
countries), firm assignments are available and data on renewals in countries 
requiring this can also be viewed. 
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